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In this paper we analyze the favorableness and extent of the media coverage of the CNB’s 
monetary policy decisions in the period of 2002–2007. We identify the factors explaining 
the variance in these two dimensions using an extensive set of articles published in the 
four most relevant Czech daily broadsheets immediately after monetary policy meetings. 
We take account of parameters of the CNB’s actual monetary policy decisions and related 
communication as well as variables characterizing the general economic environment that 
prevailed at the times of the individual meetings. The most appealing results are that 
those CNB’s decisions that surprise financial markets are − if needed − not negatively 
perceived by the media and that the media welcomes interest rate changes. Therefore, 
from the media coverage point of view, there is no need for too much smoothing. 
Simultaneously, our analyses shed some light on how the media tends to report on 
(economic) events in general.  
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Nontechnical Summary 
Transparency and communication are particularly important for those central banks that 
conduct their monetary policies within the inflation targeting framework. Since 1998, the 
Czech National Bank (CNB) has become one of the most progressive institutions 
concerning the openness of monetary policy among inflation-targeting central banks. All 
steps taken to increase the CNB transparency have been primarily oriented toward the 
financial markets and analysts, who are naturally the main target group of the CNB’s 
communication on monetary policy decisions. A credible, accountable and transparent 
central bank should, however, also take account of the general public’s perception of its 
monetary policy decisions and the CNB does so.  
Unlike the sophisticated audience (markets, analysts), which is directly influenced by 
announcements made by the central bank (available, for example, on its web site), the 
general public is indirectly reached by the bank primarily through the media. In this 
paper, we find it appropriate and useful to take a look back at the media’s perception of 
the CNB’s monetary policy decisions in the period of 2002–2007.  
In our paper, we find that some parameters of the CNB’s actual decisions and their 
communication, as well as several variables characterizing the contemporary economic 
environment, are significant (while some are not) in explaining the variability of the 
media’s coverage.  
Our major results are the following. First, the media is in general qualitatively indifferent 
to the fact that the CNB surprises the market from time to time with its interest rate 
decisions. Simultaneously, such surprising decisions, i.e. those which are not priced in 
market interest rates yet before the meeting, attract the attention of the media, which 
manifests itself in more/longer articles. Second, the media welcomes when the CNB 
moves interest rates and pays special attention to such decisions. Third, the media does 
not like rising inflation but welcomes accelerating GDP growth, and vice versa. Fourth, 
the new quarterly macroeconomic forecast attracts the attention of the media. Finally, 
movements of the exchange rate are a good reason to write about the CNB’s monetary 
policy meetings with appreciation of the koruna exchange rate being negatively perceived 
in the media.  
To sum up, the factors that turned out to be significant for the coverage of the CNB’s 
decisions suggest that the media seems to understand in principle (not in all aspects 
however) what the CNB usually does in the field of monetary policy, and why it does it, 




Transparency and communication are particularly important for those central banks that 
conduct their monetary policies within the inflation targeting framework. The Czech 
National Bank (CNB) has been applying this regime since 1998 and since then it has 
become one of the most progressive institutions concerning the openness of monetary 
policy among its peers. The CNB’s efforts to become more and more transparent in terms 
of monetary policy decisions and their background have intensified recently, with some 
changes having been introduced to the existing set of communication tools. Filáček et al. 
(2007) present the reasons underlying the CNB’s decision to start publishing interest rate 
forecasts in 2008. Moreover, the CNB has been publishing the votes cast by individual 
board members on interest rate decisions by name starting in 2008. And very recently, the 
CNB has decided to disclose the exchange rate trajectory consistent with its quarterly 
macroeconomic forecast as well.
1  
All these steps taken have been primarily oriented toward the financial markets and 
analysts, who are naturally the main target group of the CNB’s communication on 
monetary policy decisions. As a matter of fact, inflation-targeting central banks are in 
general particularly highly dependent on the market perception of their policy decisions 
and communication.
2 A credible, accountable and transparent central bank should, 
however, also take account of the general public’s perception of its monetary policy 
decisions. This can be backed not only by the aim of a typical inflation-targeting central 
bank to affect the formation of people’s inflation expectations, wage-bargaining and other 
price-setting processes. Another reason is that many central banks deal with challenges 
stemming from the fact that over time they have become almost fully independent of 
governments (even being sometimes accused of getting out of democratic control) and 
some form of accountability to the public is perceived as necessary.  
Unlike the sophisticated audience (markets, analysts), which is directly influenced by 
announcements made by the central bank (available, for example, on its web site), the 
general public is indirectly reached by the bank primarily through the media. The media’s 
perception of monetary policy decisions and communication is thus important for the 
extent and quality of the central bank’s influence on the general public and people’s view 
of the credibility of the bank’s monetary policy. Inversely, from the general public’s point 
of view, monetary policy reflection in the media is undoubtedly crucial for assessing the 
role the central bank plays in the country’s macroeconomic and monetary developments.  
 
                                                           
1 See the press release at: 
http://www.cnb.cz/en/public/media_service/press_releases_cnb/2008/081106_nom_exchange_rate.html  
or the box in Inflation Report I/2009, pp. 6–7, available at: 
http://www.cnb.cz/en/monetary_policy/inflation_reports/2009/2009_I/index.html 
2 This is the case because longer-term interest rates, determined, inter alia, by market expectations of 
future monetary policy, play a key role in the actual decision-making of economic agents. And, 
accordingly, these longer-term rates (rather than the short-term ones under the direct control of a 
central bank) co-determine the ultimate macroeconomic outcomes the central bank aims to influence. 4   Jiří Böhm, Petr Král and Branislav Saxa 
 
   
In this respect, it looks obvious to us that the media’s perception of a central bank 
monetary policy decision is always right, as it is so “by definition,” just like anyone else’s 
authentic perception or impression of whatever event, whoever’s action, etc. In other 
words, no one can blame anyone else but him- or herself that someone else’s perception 
of his or her action is bad, false, inadequate and wrong or biased. And as a result, he or 
she should then reconsider his or her own way of doing and/or communicating things to 
get a better perception or response, rather than looking for weak spots of the counterpart.  
Taking the aforementioned into account, we find it appropriate and useful to take a look 
back at the media’s perception of the CNB’s monetary policy decisions in the period of 
2002–2007. In doing so, we closely follow the methodological approach suggested by 
Berger, Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2006), which can be considered pioneering work in this 
research area (see part 3 of our paper, containing a literature review). In other words, our 
study is a national application of their novel multi-country oriented research and both 
their approach and their results serve as an obvious benchmark for us.  
The above-mentioned time period seems very convenient for the purposes of our research, 
its results and their interpretation for two reasons. First, this time span preceded big 
changes recently made in the CNB’s communication, and these changes – despite being 
oriented toward a rather sophisticated audience – could have somehow modified the 
pattern of the CNB’s reflection in the media. And second, that period of time was 
characterized by quite smooth economic developments in which the perception of the 
CNB’s decisions might have primarily been affected by ordinary domestic monetary and 
economic phenomena and the CNB’s own track record in terms of its decisions and their 
justifications. From this point of view, it will be interesting to see how the results of 
potential future research on the same topic will be influenced the global financial and 
economic crisis and related negative tone currently prevailing in the media’s reporting of 
economic events.  
In our analysis, we find that some parameters of the CNB’s actual decisions and their 
communication, as well as several variables characterizing the contemporary economic 
environment, are significant (while some are not) in explaining the variability of the 
media’s coverage. On top of that, we attach our interpretation of the results obtained. 
Simultaneously, our results shed some light on how the media tends to report on 
(economic) events in general.  
To unwrap our major results in brief, we can list the following. First, the media does not 
perceive negatively the fact that the CNB from time to time surprises financial markets 
with its interest rate decisions. And in turn, such decisions attract the attention of the 
media, which leads to more/longer articles. Second, the media welcomes interest rates 
changes regardless of their direction and pays special attention to such decisions. Third, 
the media does not like surging inflation while on the other hand it welcomes GDP 
growth gaining momentum, and vice versa. Fourth, the intensity of inter-meeting 
communication of the CNB’s board members, proxied by the number of their statements, 
proved to have a significant bearing on both the favorableness and the extent of the 
media’s coverage only if special circumstances, such as a surprising decision being made 





quarterly macroeconomic forecast increases the media’s coverage of the bank board 
meetings. Finally, exchange rate movements are a good reason for the media to report on 
the CNB’s monetary policy meetings. As a matter of fact, inter-meeting appreciation of 
the koruna exchange rate seems to be negatively perceived in the media with no regard to 
the level of the exchange rate vis-à-vis its trend with the inverse being true for 
appreciation of the domestic currency. All in all, the media seems to understand in 
principle what the CNB usually does in the field of monetary policy, and why it does it, 
and pays proper attention to its decisions where appropriate.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The second section provides an 
overview of literature relevant to the topic of our research. The third section describes the 
data used and defines the variables we employ to characterize the media’s coverage of the 
CNB Board’s decisions on interest rate settings. The fourth section displays the results of 
our estimations and interprets them. The fifth section discusses robustness issues 
concerning the results we obtained, while the last section summarizes and concludes.  
 
2. Literature Review  
The growing importance of communication in monetary policy has initiated a substantial 
amount of research in this area over the last decade. In their survey, Blinder et al. (2008) 
suggest dividing the available literature into two main strands. The first strand analyzes 
the impact of communication on the financial markets, while the second one links the 
differences in monetary policy communication strategies across countries to differences 
in inflation performance in these countries. The following paragraphs summarize the 
available literature linking communication and its effect on the financial markets as well 
as the relatively scarce literature on the effects of communication on the general public. 
Research on the impact of central bank communication on the financial markets has 
received relatively strong attention over the last decade. Typically, empirical studies 
examine how central bank statements move the financial markets. Guthrie and Wright 
(2000) show how the monetary conditions index moves in the expected direction after a 
surprising announcement in the case of New Zealand. Kohn and Sack (2003) quantify the 
effects of Federal Reserve statements on the volatility of interest rates. Reeves and 
Sawicki (2007) find that while the Bank of England Minutes and Inflation Reports affect 
the financial markets significantly, the effect of testimonies to parliament and speeches is 
limited or insignificant. Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2007) investigate how the different 
communication strategies of the Federal Reserve, the Bank of England and the European 
Central Bank enable markets to anticipate monetary policy decisions. Their empirical 
findings support their hypothesis that the predictability of policy decisions is higher and 
the reaction of the financial markets is stronger in the cases of the Federal Reserve and 
the European Central Bank, which practice a more collegial approach to decision-making 
and communication. Another notable contribution is the work of Fracasso et al. (2003), 
who assess the quality of inflation reports of different central banks and search for a link 6   Jiří Böhm, Petr Král and Branislav Saxa 
 
   
between the assessed quality of inflation reports and a measure of monetary policy 
surprise across countries. 
More relevantly to our research, the impact of central bank communication on the general 
public through the media is investigated in a couple of papers. Amtenbrink and De Hahn 
(2002) assess the transparency of the ECB and, as part of their research, analyze the 
monetary policy decision coverage in the Financial Times and Frankfurter Allgemeine 
Zeitung (the results are also discussed in De Hahn et al., 2004). They find that while the 
UK-based Financial Times tends to be more focused on the inflation targeting pillar of 
ECB decision-making, the Germany-based Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung follows 
monetary and credit growth more. Berger, Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2006) use data on the 
favorableness and extent of the press coverage of ECB monetary policy decisions in 
national and international newspapers. Coverage is found to be less favorable if a decision 
is surprising or if the recent inflation figure is high. On the other hand, positive effects on 
the favorableness of coverage are identified in the case of the quarterly staff projection 
release and in the case of a good explanation of a surprising decision at the press 
conference. Given the novelty of this approach, the authors argue that comparable 
research on the communication of other central banks might shed light on the efficiency 
of different communication channels. Also, Blinder et al. (2008) in their survey call for 
research oriented on communication with the general public. Our study is one of the 
contributions to this strand of literature.  
Finally, four studies focus particularly on the communication of the CNB. Navrátil and 
Kotlán (2005) asses the predictability of the CNB’s decisions through market pricing. 
Bulíř et al. (2007) analyze the CNB’s major communication tools to assess the clarity of 
its communication as whole. By comparing the messages sent by inflation forecasts, the 
verbal assessment of inflation risks in inflation reports and the voting within the CNB 
Board, the authors found that the CNB’s communication is highly clear. Together with 
their finding that it is also open and timely, the authors conclude that the CNB’s monetary 
policy is transparent. Bulíř et al. (2009) using their novel methodology assess whether the 
communication of selected central banks around the world (including the CNB) 
corresponds to the true state of the world. Specifically, the authors compare the inflation 
factors authentically reported in the inflation (or similar) reports published by the banks 
under scrutiny with those factors identified ex post by the authors using their new-
Keynesian calibrated country-specific models. The study finds that central banks with 
more sophisticated forecasting frameworks (among which the CNB ranks) generally 
reported the same factors as those identified by the authors. In the fourth study focused on 
the communication of the CNB, Fišer and Horváth (2009) investigate the effect of central 
bank communication on the volatility of the exchange rate. Using daily data on the 
exchange rate, the authors use GARCH analysis to find how communication through two 
particular channels – the comments of board members and the minutes of monetary policy 
meetings – influence exchange rate volatility. Their results suggest that CNB 
communication lowers the volatility of the exchange rate.  





3. Data Description and Stylized Facts  
3.1 Data on Press Coverage 
Similarly to Berger, Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2006), the analysis presented in this paper 
is based on a dataset that measures the favorableness and quantity of the press coverage of 
central bank monetary policy decisions received after press conferences. In this case, we 
focus on the CNB, which holds its monetary policy meetings typically on Thursdays. The 
decisions of the board are usually announced shortly after the decision has been taken and 
explained during press conferences later in the afternoon. The analysis in this paper is 
based on articles published in selected dailies within the following two days (the 
following Fridays and Saturdays).  
The time period examined runs from January 2002 to September 2007 inclusive. Focusing 
on the reactions of the public to CNB monetary policy decisions during a relatively long 
period inevitably calls for some simplification aimed at avoiding excessive costs. 
Therefore, we took advantage of the Newton I.T. service, which facilitates the collection 
of the relevant press articles using pre-defined key words.  
Since the analysis covers the monetary policy decisions of the CNB, the selected 
broadsheets are only those published in the Czech Republic, namely Mladá fronta Dnes, 
Právo, Hospodářské noviny and Lidové noviny. The selection of the data sources, 
however, is a kind of trade-off between their relevance to the examined topic and the 
volume of readers they address. The result is a marked preference for the relevance factor, 
because the aggregate share of the selected dailies in the total volume of newspaper 
copies sold daily is less than 40 per cent. Nevertheless, we are convinced that this 
approach does not result in the loss of any important information. Firstly, the group of 
readers targeted by the tabloids is in general not interested in economic topics. Secondly, 
the tabloids mostly do not assess the CNB’s monetary policy decisions; at most they only 
carry information about them. Thirdly, as we are interested in the instant media’s reaction 
to the CNB’s latest decisions we focus on dailies only, as weekly and monthly 
newspapers and magazines usually provide their readers with monetary policy 
commentaries and assessments taking account of the CNB’s longer-term track record.
3 
Unlike Berger, Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2006), we do not use the assessments of 
specialized in-house media experts in the CNB, in order to avoid any staff-related bias. 
As a result we were forced to turn to external assessors – three university students from 
different departments who did not know each other. Nevertheless, this approach has one 
substantial advantage – neither the authors nor anyone else affiliated with the CNB could 
influence the assessment procedure. The alternative solution would have been an 
automated assessment process, for example by using a set of pre-defined meaning-rated 
key words. The reason for preferring human assessment – as we were looking for the 
reader’s impression or perception – is that language is manifold and so there is a risk of 
                                                           
3 Simultaneously and accordingly, we would not have had a sufficiently long sample of articles 
published in weekly and monthly magazines dedicated solely to the previous CNB monetary policy 
meeting (twelve meetings a year) to do our analyses.  8   Jiří Böhm, Petr Král and Branislav Saxa 
 
   
omitting some assessments and in turn of losing part of the information. Besides, the mere 
balancing of a number of positive and negative opinions without the application of 
(“subjective”) judgment seems to be rather misleading. It may easily happen that a larger 
number of insignificant arguments outweigh a smaller number of high-calibrated counter-
arguments and thereby change the true tone of the article in question.  
Much like in the aforementioned paper, the coverage of each newspaper is measured in a 
subjective qualitative and an exact quantitative way. The qualitative assessment 
(favorableness) is based on the external assessors’ opinions. It shows how well the media 
understands and judges monetary policy decisions. It thus indicates the perceived quality 
of the monetary policy decision itself, the communication of that decision and more 
generally its track-record and the related economic environment. This is very important 
because maintaining a transparent and appreciated monetary policy is a crucial 
precondition for enhancing its credibility and subsequently its effectiveness, particularly 
within the inflation targeting regime.  
The favorableness with which the CNB’s monetary policy decisions are discussed is 
measured, as in the case of Berger, Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2006), on a scale ranging 
from very negative (-2), via negative (-1), neutral (0) and favorable (1), to very favorable 
(2). The key principle is that the favorableness assessment is linked solely to press 
reactions to a given particular monetary policy decision and to the explanation of that 
decision at the press conference, whereas any opinions on CNB monetary policy in 
general and/or on the CNB as an institution itself are ignored. Although the articles often 
contain contradictory arguments of the journalist and/or quoted analysts, the 
favorableness (perception or impression) of the whole article is assessed. Surprising 
monetary policy decisions are a clear example of assessment ambiguity. On the one hand, 
such surprises are often considered to be negative. On the other hand, some analysts 
admit that such surprises belong in the central bank’s monetary policy arsenal, thereby 
turning the tone of their assessment somewhat in the opposite direction. 
The quantitative assessment shows how much attention the media paid to the monetary 
policy decision in question. The basic measure used is simply the length of the article, as 
expressed by the number of words. All the measures of favorableness and quantity of 
coverage are defined in detail in the next two sub-sections. 
Table A1 in the appendix provides an overview of the descriptive statistics of the 
monetary policy meeting coverage in the four newspapers. Hospodářské noviny covered 
66 out of 70 monetary policy meetings, i.e. substantially more than any of the other 
newspapers (32–35 each). While the average favorableness is comparable across 
newspapers, the average absolute value of favorableness and the average length of the 
articles suggest slight differences in coverage across newspapers. Looking at the average 
absolute favorableness, Lidové noviny seems to be most extreme in its perception, being 
often either markedly positive or markedly negative, while Mladá fronta Dnes is on 
average closest to a neutral assessment of monetary policy decisions. The economic daily 
Hospodářské noviny covers monetary policy meetings most extensively, in terms of both 





3.2 Favorableness of Coverage 
Our database covers 263 articles published in 4 newspapers over the period of January 
2002 to September 2007. Since favorableness, one of our explained variables, is 
constructed using the assessment of three independent evaluators, we first check for 
consistency and reliability of these evaluations. The means and standard deviations of the 
evaluations provided by the three evaluators are shown in Table A2 in the appendix.
4 
Table A3 in the appendix illustrates the differences in the evaluations provided by the 
three evaluators. The vast majority of the articles have either the same evaluation or 
evaluations differing by one notch. Two evaluators assigned evaluations differing by 
three notches to the same article in the case of one article.
5 Overall, the evaluations 
provide a reasonably consistent assessment and our favorableness indicator for each 
article is thus constructed as the average of the evaluations supplied by the three 
evaluators.  
In the next step, we compare how positively or negatively the individual meetings were 
covered by the four different newspapers. For this purpose, the favorableness indicator for 
each meeting and each newspaper is constructed as the average of the favorableness for 
all articles published in that newspaper after that meeting.  
For the purposes of the main econometric analysis of monetary policy coverage in the 
print media, three favorableness indicators are constructed at the level of meetings. While 
we use only one indicator throughout most of the paper, two alternative indicators are 
used to check the robustness of the results. We follow Berger, Ehrmann and Fratzscher 
(2006) and our preferred indicator is based on the simple average of the favorableness 































where nm is the number of newspapers covering meeting m, favorableness of articlem,i,j is 
the favorableness of the j-th article published in newspaper i following meeting m, and 
km,i denotes the number of articles published in newspaper i after meeting m. Not to put 
higher weight on a newspaper with many short articles compared to a newspaper with a 
smaller number of longer articles, favorableness is averaged across articles in each 
newspaper first.  
While our preferred indicator treats all articles in all four newspapers as equally 
important, our second and third indicators assign higher importance to articles with a 
                                                           
4 The pairwise correlations of the evaluations given by the three evaluators are 0.43, 0.46 and 0.68. 
5 An article published in MF Dnes on January 31, 2003. It covers a very surprising decision of the 
central bank to cut the key interest rate, coinciding with the Czech Statistical Office admitting a 
substantial mistake in the foreign trade data. At the same time, the author of the article emphasizes the 
expected positive effect of the interest rate cut on mortgage interest rates. 10   Jiří Böhm, Petr Král and Branislav Saxa 
 
   
higher impact on the general public. The second indicator puts greater emphasis on 
articles published in newspapers read by more readers. It is defined as a weighted average 












































where  circulationm,i  is the circulation of newspaper i at the time of monetary policy 
meeting m, recorded on a monthly basis.  
Finally the third measure adds information about the position of the article in the 
newspaper. An article on the title page is expected to have a greater impact than articles 
positioned elsewhere. In addition, some newspapers publish articles covering monetary 
policy meetings on the title page quite often, while others do so only from time to time. In 
our third measure, the assumption is that a title page article published in the latter group 
of newspapers has a greater impact on readers than a title page article from the former 
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where ai
all is the total number of articles covering monetary policy meetings published in 
newspaper i over the sample period and ai
title page  is the number of title page articles 
covering monetary policy meetings published in newspaper i over the sample period. 
The favorableness described above does not exhibit any trend over time, although lower-
than-average favorableness can be observed at the beginning of the sample (see Figure A1 
in the appendix).  
We extend the methodology of Berger, Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2006) and, unlike them, 
we also examine the determinants of the heterogeneity of favorableness of coverage. In 
order to judge how heterogeneous the favorableness of coverage of the four newspapers is 
after every meeting, a measure of dispersion – defined as the sample standard deviation of 
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In order to exploit as much of the variance in favorableness across articles as possible, 
favorableness is not averaged across articles for each newspaper as in the case of the 
favorablness
1 construction. Instead, the dispersion is the simple sample standard deviation 
of the favorableness of all articles. In cases where only one article covers a monetary 
policy meeting, the dispersion is deliberately set to be not defined. The reason for not 
using cases with only one article is that a dispersion equal to zero would indicate two 
possible situations – either no heterogeneity in favorableness or a lack of media interest.  
A very simple way of looking at the heterogeneity of coverage is to examine the pairwise 
correlations of favorablness
1 between pairs of newspapers. While the favorableness of the 
major economic daily, Hospodářské noviny, is fairly well correlated with the stance of 
Mladá fronta Dnes and Lidové noviny (0.61 and 0.43, respectively), the remaining 
pairwise correlations are lower, as shown in Table A4 in the appendix. One possible 
explanation for the differences in the favorableness of coverage of monetary policy 
meetings across newspapers is that monetary policy actions are poorly explained and 
public opinion is thus fragmented and confused. We focus on this issue by examining the 
determinants of the dispersion of favorableness in Section 4.3. 
 
3.3 Extent of Coverage 
Besides favorableness, we also focus on the extent of coverage of monetary policy 
meetings. To construct indicators of the extent of coverage for each meeting, three 
variables are recorded for each article. First, the length of each article is defined as the 
number of words in the article. Second, a dummy indicating whether the article appears 
on the title page is recorded. Third, the monthly circulation data for each daily are used to 
reflect the impact of particular newspapers.  
Four distinct measures of the extent of coverage are constructed. As in the case of the 
favorableness indicators, only one is used throughout most of the analysis. The three 
remaining indicators are employed for robustness checks. The first indicator – the sum of 
the lengths of all articles – is a simple sum of the lengths of all articles covering the 12   Jiří Böhm, Petr Král and Branislav Saxa 
 
   
monetary policy meeting in the four dailies after each meeting.
6 The evolution of extentm
1 























The second measure assigns greater importance to newspapers with higher circulation. It 









































where n is the number of newspapers covering meeting m and length of coverage in 
newspaperi,m is the sum of the lengths of all articles published in newspaper i following 









































Finally, we construct a simple measure of the number of title page articles covering the 
monetary policy meeting. This variable, denoted as extentm
4, takes values in the range 0 to 
4, where 0 means no coverage on the title page of any of the four newspapers. The 
evolution of extentm
4 is plotted in Figure A3 in the appendix.  
                                                           
6 In the pioneering paper of Berger, Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2006), a five-step ranking is used to 





Table 1: Baseline Definitions of Dependant Variables 
Concept Variable Definition
Favorableness Favorableness
Favorableness of monetary policy meeting press
coverage. Aggregated across three evaluators,
four newspapers and adhoc number of articles in
each newspapers.
Extent
Extent of monetary policy meeting press coverage.
Defined as a sum of lengths of all articles covering
the monetary policy meeting in four newspapers
after each meeting.
Extent
4 (the number of title page articles)
The number of title page articles covering
monetary policy meeting in four newspaper.
Dispersion Dispersion
Sample standard deviation of favorablness of all 
articles published after each meeting. Not defined 





3.4 Relationship between Favorableness, its Dispersion and the Length of 
Coverage 
Before searching for a broader set of determinants of favorableness, its dispersion and the 
length of coverage, we inspect the relationship between these three variables. Our 
motivation stems from the expectation that the amount of coverage can be influenced by 
favorableness and by controversy proxied by the dispersion of favorableness. Also, it is 
possible that controversy is associated more often with more negative, more positive or 
simply more extreme coverage. Graphically, the pairwise relationships between the three 
variables are depicted in Figure A5 in the appendix.  
 
Tables 2 and 3 illustrate the possible general pattern of how newspapers tend to report on 
events. Table 2 shows how the length of coverage is related to the level and dispersion of 
favorableness. The results from our core dataset do not provide any evidence of more 
extensive coverage being associated with more extreme, positive or negative, 
favorableness (Models 1–3 in Table 2). However, in less aggregated settings, when we 
aggregate favorableness and extent across articles in each newspaper but not across 
newspapers, the results differ. In such settings, absolute favorableness is positively and 
significantly correlated with the extent of coverage (Table 3). The relationship thus 
exhibits a U-curve, i.e. very positive and very negative articles tend to be longer than 
neutral ones. A similar relationship is observed in Berger, Ehrmann and Fratzscher 
(2006). When looking at the relationship between the length and the dispersion of 
favorableness, Models 4–7 in Table 2 indicate that more dispersed favorableness across 
articles is associated with more extensive coverage.  14   Jiří Böhm, Petr Král and Branislav Saxa 
 
   
Table 2: Relationship between the Length of Coverage, Favorableness and its 
Dispersion (length is the dependent variable) 
Favorableness -372.5 -214.7
(463.0) (417.7)
Favorableness (abs) 878.4 745.9 -741.0 -736.8
(644.5) (651.0) (696.9) (705.1)
Negative favorableness dummy 390.1 -24.7
(317.5) (285.6)
Dispersion of favorableness 2689.7 *** 2697.5 *** 3021.3 *** 3029.5 ***
(493.4) (497.0) (583.2) (596.3)
Constant 1167.1 *** 938.2 *** 877.2 *** 444.7 ** 457.0 ** 496.5 ** 499.4 **
(140.2) (195.2) (200.7) (205.7) (208.5) (211.2) (215.9)
Adjusted R-squared -0.01 0.01 0.02 0.34 0.33 0.34 0.33
Number of observations 69 69 69 56 56 56 56
Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
 
Note: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
Table 3: Relationship between the Length of Coverage and Favorableness, Data 
Aggregated across Articles in Each Newspapers but not across Newspapers 
(length is the dependent variable) 
Favorableness 18.0
(64.9)





Constant 468.0 *** 393.1 *** 395.1 ***
(28.7) (37.8) (38.1)
Adjusted R-squared -0.01 0.04 0.04
Number of observations 168 168 168
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
 
Note: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
3.5 Possible Determinants 
By determinants we mean variables whose level, change or distance from another variable 
or constant may be important for how the media perceives the “appropriateness” of the 
CNB’s monetary policy decisions (favorableness of coverage), how it assesses 
“importance” to inform its readers about bank board meetings (extent of coverage) and 
how it differs in the tone of articles devoted to interest rate decisions (dispersion of 
favorableness).  
Two groups of possible determinants of favorableness, its dispersion and the extent of 
coverage are considered. The first group involves determinants that can be influenced to 
large extent by the central bank directly prior to the meeting or during the meeting day. 
These include the decision about interest rates, surprise proxied by the market reaction, 
and the intensity of inter-meeting communication (and possibly also the publication of 
press conference slides, the “interest rate sentence”, the ratio of the votes cast at the 
monetary policy meeting, the concord between the decision and the interest rate sentence, 






The determinants in the second group describe the state of the economic environment at 
the time of the monetary policy meeting. Here, the variables are linked, for example, to 
CPI inflation, GDP growth and the exchange rate of the Czech currency vis-à-vis euro. 
The variables used in the baseline models explaining the variation in favorableness, its 
dispersion and the extent of coverage are defined in Table 4. Alternative definitions that 
were also considered are mentioned either later in the text where we comment on 
particular regressions or in the part devoted to additional regressions. 
Table 4: Definitions of Determinants 
Concept Variable Definition
Surprise Surprise - Market Interest Rate Reaction (abs)        
A day-on-day change of one month market interest
rates recorded after each monetary policy meeting.
Monetary Policy Interest Rate Change (abs)            A change of the key policy interest rate.
Interest Rate Level
A level of the key policy interest rate before the
monetary policy meeting.
Inflation Recent CPI Inflation Change 
Month-on-month difference of headline year-on-
year CPI inflation.
GDP Recent GDP Growth Change
Indicator equal to the quarter-on-quarter change of
year-on-year GDP growth for the first meeting after
the release of quarterly GDP figures. Equal to zero
for the second and third meeting after each
release.
Communication Intensity
A number of monetary policy related statements
provided by the members of the board in the inter-
meeting period. 
Communication Intensity - Governor
A number of monetary policy related statements
provided by the governor in the inter-meeting
period. 
Communication Intensity - Other Board Members
A number of monetary policy related statements
provided by the members of the board in the inter-
meeting period. 
CNB Forecast Forecast Released                                   
A dummy variable equal to one if a new CNB
forecast is released at the press conference
following the monetary policy meeting.
EURCZK Inter-meeting Change
Percentage meeting-to-meeting change of
EURCZK exchange rate. Positive values are
associated with the depreciation of the Czech
currency, negative values are associated with the
appreciation.
EURCZK Inter-meeting change (abs)
Absolute value of a percentage meeting-to-meeting





4. Estimation and Results  
Employing the set of potential explanatory variables chosen, we proceed to estimate the 
econometric models. First, we comment on the estimates of our preferred model 
specifications with respect to the signs and statistical significance of the individual 
explanatory variables and their most functional modifications. Then we discuss modified 
specifications of the variables and models. Simultaneously, we include our interpretations 
of the results obtained. 16   Jiří Böhm, Petr Král and Branislav Saxa 
 
   
 
4.1 Results: Determinants of Favorableness 
To estimate the model with favorableness as the dependent variable, we use ordinary least 
squares estimation with robust standard errors. While ordered probit would be a natural 
choice on the disaggregated level (due to the ordinal nature of the favorableness indicator, 
where the difference between favorableness values 0 and 1 can be different from the 
difference between values 1 and 2), the situation changes with a high level of aggregation. 
Once we aggregate favorableness across evaluators, articles and newspapers, we end up 
with 28 different values of favorableness.  
 
The following paragraphs discuss the results of the estimation of Model 1, summarized in 
Table 5. 
Table 5: Determinants of Favorableness (Model 1) 
Surprise - Market IR Reaction (abs)                   -0.268
(0.417)
Monetary Policy Interest Rate Change (abs)            0.421 *
(0.243)
Interest Rate Level -0.197 ***
(0.068)
Recent CPI Inflation Change  -0.146 **
(0.057)




Forecast Released                                    -0.158 *
(0.079)





Number of observations 69  
Note: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
Surprise Measured as the Reaction of the Market Interest Rate 
Although the sign of the coefficient suggests a negative impact of surprising decisions on 
the favorableness of coverage, the effect is not statistically significant. This might be to 
some extent a result of the relatively high correlation between the indicator of surprising 
decisions and the indicator of the release of the new forecast (see the paragraph on the 
release of the new forecast for a more extensive explanation). Excluding the indicator of 
the release of the new forecast from the set of explanatory variables leads to a notably 
stronger estimated effect of surprising decisions on favorableness but it is still statistically 





expectations about the interest rate change and the actual decision – does not yield a 
statistically significant coefficient on surprise either. Let us say that a “neutral” media’s 
perception of the fact that the CNB from time to time surprises the market might be 
interpreted as indicating that the media has got used to the fact that surprise belongs to 
standard monetary policy making and that the CNB can/must lead the market through the 
monetary cycle. 
Monetary Policy Interest Rate Change 
Absolute change matters. Favorableness increases with any change of monetary policy 
interest rates. A typical 0.25 pp change in monetary policy rates leads to favorableness 
rising by 0.11 (0.42 x 0.25). Historically, interest rate hikes lead to an almost identical 
increase in favorableness as interest rate cuts do. The coefficients on positive and 
negative interest rate changes are estimated at 0.53 and -0.31, respectively (not reported). 
Thus, the media tends to welcome CNB activity materializing in interest rate changes 
intended to rein in inflation or steer it toward the target and to smooth economic 
developments, regardless of the direction of change. This can be considered a good 
environment for the CNB to do its job and is probably a result of the transparent inflation 
targeting regime the CNB applies. The other modifications of the monetary policy interest 
rate considered as determinants include the interest rate change (not in absolute terms), a 
dummy equal to one if the interest rate is changed and the interest rate level, as discussed 
in the next paragraph. 
 
Monetary Policy Interest Rate Level 
At times of high monetary policy interest rate levels, the press tends to perceive monetary 
policy decisions more negatively. An interest rate level higher by 0.25 pp accounts for 
favorableness being lower by approximately 0.05 (-0.2 x 0.25). However, as monetary 
policy interest rates are closely linked to CPI inflation, the result could potentially also be 
interpreted as a preference for low inflation. An estimation with an alternative choice of 
determinants presented in Table A5 in the appendix takes account of this. Once Recent 
CPI Inflation (headline figure) is used instead of Monetary Policy Interest Rate Level and 
Recent CPI Inflation Change, the results suggest that an increase in CPI inflation of 1 pp 
lowers favorableness by approximately 0.042, but the coefficient is statistically 
insignificant. The estimated coefficients on the rest of the determinants are similar to 
those estimated in Model 1, hence we prefer Model 1 to its alternative specification 
(Model 1 also has generally better statistical properties and a better relation to the 
subsequent results). 
Another question stems from the fact that the statistical relationship between the interest 
rate level and favorableness hinges to large extent on the data from the beginning of 2002. 
At that time, relatively negative media coverage accompanied a period of high interest 
rate levels. The question is whether the negative media coverage at that time was 
influenced by the high interest rates or whether the concurrence was just a coincidence. 
Once the first six meetings in 2002 are dropped, the coefficient on the interest rate level 
remains negative, but not significant (table not reported here).  18   Jiří Böhm, Petr Král and Branislav Saxa 
 
   
CPI Inflation 
We considered a number of specifications regarding the influence of the CPI inflation 
data on the favorableness of monetary policy meeting coverage. Besides the levels and 
changes of headline CPI inflation, we tested the relevance of indicators related to the 
target and a one percentage point tolerance band around the target (the distance of 
inflation from the target, inflation below or above target, etc.) as well as the relevance of 
dummy indicators equal to one when inflation exceeds the sample average or the 12-
month moving average. In terms of statistical significance, explanatory power and 
robustness across the model specifications, the month-on-month change in headline year-
on-year CPI inflation is the most suitable determinant of the favorableness of coverage. A 
month-on-month rise of year-on-year CPI inflation by 0.5 pp (i.e. slightly more than one 
standard deviation) is estimated to have a negative effect on favorableness with a 
magnitude of approximately 0.075 (-0.15 x 0.5).  
Looking at our results, we can offer at least two possible explanations for the potentially 
disappointing fact that a deviation of inflation from its target is not important for the 
media’s assessment of monetary policy decisions. The first explanation (the optimistic 
one) assumes that the media understands the forward-looking element in interest rate 
setting. Therefore, the actual inflation deviation is considered to be of little relevance both 
for the CNB itself (in its own considerations) and for the media. The second explanation 
(the pessimistic one) is that the inflation target is too abstract a concept for the media and 
so it tends to focus on the recent trend in inflation instead. Bearing in mind that inflation 
has for most of the time been under the CNB’s inflation target, the media may not be 
familiar enough with the “true” objective of the CNB, i.e. to have inflation at the target 
(and not below it).  
GDP Growth 
As in the case of CPI inflation, a number of indexes were constructed and tested to 
answer the question of whether GDP growth influences the favorableness of monetary 
policy meeting coverage. One complication with GDP releases is that new figures are 
released on a quarterly basis. GDP indicators with a constant value over the three months 
after release have a low explanatory power in our regressions. However, we identified a 
relatively strong power of GDP growth news in the coverage of the first monetary policy 
meeting after the GDP statistics are released. The indicator used to approximate GDP 
news is equal to the quarter-on-quarter change in year-on-year GDP growth for the first 
meeting after the release of the quarterly GDP figures. For the two subsequent meetings, 
the indicator is equal to zero. Again, as in the case of inflation, a difference between the 
two recently released figures has a far stronger impact on favorableness than the level of 
GDP growth itself. A half percentage point quarter-on-quarter rise in headline GDP 
growth is related to an increase in favorableness of a strong 0.13 (0.25 x 0.5). Thus, the 
media likes accelerating GDP growth and this in general coincidently increases the 
favorableness of its perception of the CNB’s decisions (and vice versa). 





These results (CPI and GDP figures) simultaneously shed some light on the way 
journalists and the public might process macroeconomic news. As journalists and 
commentators get used to a certain level of a macroeconomic indicator quite swiftly, a 
change in the indicator compared to its previous month’s (quarter’s) value is likely to 
have a stronger impact on the perception of the indicator than the level of the indicator 
itself or a deviation from its target (trend). A level (despite being very high or very low) is 
often not as attractive for journalists as a change. Only a change can be perceived as an 
event, and the media generally tends to report on events rather than on states. 
Communication Intensity 
Communication intensity proxied by the number of monetary policy-related statements 
provided by the members of the board is not significant in explaining the favorableness of 
coverage. This might reflect the fact that more comments do not necessarily provide 
better information on the stance of the board members. It is easy to imagine a situation of 
high uncertainty about the next step of the central bank, which triggers demand for 
statements. The statements provided may be clear individually, but rather ambiguous and 
contradictory when aggregated across members of the board. So, the statements of 
individual bank board members are probably welcomed by the media at times preceding 
monetary meetings but are not significant for the media’s perception of the actual 
outcome of the meeting (unless the decision taken comes as a surprise – see below). 
Release of a New Forecast 
Over the years 2002–2007, a new forecast was released quarterly and introduced to the 
public at the press conference following every third monetary policy meeting. The 
hypothesis that the introduction of a new forecast can influence the favorableness of 
coverage draws on the expectation that the forecast can be helpful in explaining and 
justifying the decision of the board members. The release of a new forecast is represented 
as a dummy variable equal to one if a new forecast is released and zero otherwise. The 
estimation of Model 1 shows, however, that favorableness is influenced negatively. The 
coefficient on the new forecast is to some extent influenced by extremely negative 
coverage at the beginning of the sample (see Figure A1). Estimation without the first, 
most extreme observation leads to a non-significant coefficient for the indicator of the 
new forecast (with the other coefficients and their significance being modified only to a 
limited extent in the reduced sample compared to the full sample as shown in Table A6). 
Another issue that might influence the estimation results here is a relatively high 
correlation between the indicators of surprise and the release of the new forecast (-0.35). 
The high correlation stems from the fact that members of the board tended to change 
interest rates more frequently when a new forecast was available than at meetings 
between the forecasts (Table A7 in the appendix). In combination with the fact that 
meetings delivering an interest rate change generate higher surprise than meetings with no 
change of interest rates, it is easy to see why the release of a forecast often coincides with 
a surprising decision (Table A8 in the appendix). Consequently, it is not easy to 20   Jiří Böhm, Petr Král and Branislav Saxa 
 
   




The reactions of favorableness to changes in the exchange rate are not symmetrical. 
Appreciation leads to negative coverage and depreciation to positive coverage. A 
meeting-to-meeting change in the exchange rate of 1% leads to an average change in 
favorableness of 0.05 (5.1 x 0.01). The size of the reaction is approximately twice as 
strong in the case of depreciation compared to appreciation. The coefficients are equal to 
3.8 versus 5.8 (not reported), but these differences are not statistically significant.  
Instead of employing the meeting-to-meeting change in the exchange rate, the distance of 
the exchange rate from its linear trend and the distance from the HP filtered exchange rate 
are used as the determinants in another two alternative setups. No significant effect can be 
observed in either of these cases.  
 
4.2 Results: Determinants of Length 
In this section, we report the estimation results for the model explaining the extent of 
coverage. The sum of the lengths of all articles, defined in section 4 as extent
1, is 
considered here as the dependent variable. The results of the estimations are summarized 
in Table 6. In addition, we consider the number of title page articles as an alternative 
measure of the extent of coverage and we discuss it later in section 5.4.  
Table 6: Determinants of Length (Model 2) 
Surprise - Market IR Reaction (abs) 5401.9 ***
(1581.1)
Monetary Policy Interest Rate Change (abs) 2242.4 **
(1023.9)
Recent CPI Inflation Change 136.14
(132.0)




Forecast Released 644.87 ***
(224.2)





Number of observations 69  
Note: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
                                                           
7 Alternative specifications – one without the indicator for surprise and the other without the indicator 





Surprise Measured as the Reaction of the Market Interest Rate 
Surprising decisions lead to more extensive coverage in the newspapers. Surprise 
provides an opportunity to speculate about the reasons why the central bank delivered a 
decision different from that expected by the market and analysts. According to the 
estimation of Model 2, surprise proxied as the day-to-day reaction of the market interest 
rate is a significant determinant of the length of monetary policy meeting coverage. A 
surprising monetary policy decision corresponding to an absolute day-by-day reaction of 
the 1M interest rate of 0.1 pp is linked to an increase in coverage in the four newspapers 
of 540 words (5401 x 0.1). So, despite being perceived as neutral, a surprise generally 
attracts the attention of the media. When the alternative proxy for surprise is used (the 
difference between analysts’ expectations about the interest rate change and the actual 
change in interest rates) the coefficient on surprise becomes insignificant. 
Monetary Policy Interest Rate Change 
Similarly to favorableness, the extent of coverage increases when the board decides to 
change interest rates, irrespective of the direction of the change. On average, a 0.25 pp 
change in the key interest rate results in the coverage being longer by 560 words (2242 x 
0.25). Thus, interest rate changes – irrespective of their direction – are in principle both 
well perceived and extensively covered in the media. 
Communication Intensity 
Communication activity, proxied by the number of monetary policy statements provided 
by the members of the board in the inter-meeting communication period, is not significant 
in explaining the extent of monetary policy meeting coverage. This might be surprising at 
first sight. However, one possible explanation is that newspapers publish the statements 
when they are issued and do not return to them later after the meeting. When taken 
together with our finding that the number of statements has a neutral effect on the 
favorableness of the media’s perception, one can say that the intensity of inter-meeting 
communication is insignificant for the perception of the interest rate decision in the media 
from both the qualitative and quantitative points of view. There is, however, a counter-
finding concerning the position of an article in the newspaper being affected by the 
intensity of inter-meeting communication (see below). 
Release of the New Forecast 
Every three months, when the new forecast is released at the press conference after the 
monetary policy meeting, the length of coverage increases by 645 words on average. 
Obviously, this reflects the fact that the central bank’s forecasts of inflation and GDP are 
among the most closely monitored pieces of information provided by the central bank to 
the public. It is favorable that one of the most important communication channels of the 
CNB seems to be fulfilling its role. 
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CPI Inflation 
Unlike in the case of the favorableness of coverage, the recent CPI inflation data do not 
significantly influence the extent of the coverage. Besides the specification estimated and 
summarized in Table 6, we also considered the possibility that any change in the released 
CPI data influences the extent of coverage, irrespective of the direction of change. 
However, the absolute value of recent CPI inflation changes is not significant in 
explaining the extent either. Finally, none of the alternative indicators introduced in the 
previous section (indices related to the distance of inflation from the inflation target and 
to the distance from the moving average of inflation) is significant in explaining the 
extent of coverage. 
GDP Growth 
Recent GDP growth data influence the extent of coverage at the edge of statistical 
significance. A quarter-on-quarter decline in headline GDP growth by half a percentage 
point is linked with an increase in the length of coverage of 326 words (-652 x 0.5).  
Exchange Rate 
Despite the fact that the CNB targets inflation and has not actively intervened in the forex 
market since September 2002, the exchange rate is often discussed in articles following 
monetary policy meetings. The estimated coefficient suggests that a 1% absolute change 
in the EUR/CZK exchange rate during the inter-meeting period leads to an average 
increase in the length of coverage of 177 words (17,745 x 0.01). As the Czech currency 
exhibits relatively high volatility
8, the exchange rate is an important determinant of the 
extent of coverage. So, volatility of the exchange rate is a good reason to write about 
monetary policy regardless of the actual outcome of the particular bank board meeting. 
This is obviously due to the fact that in such a small open economy as the Czech one, the 
exchange rate influences a lot of economic variables and economic agents, hence it is 
naturally a subject of public debate and that debate is mirrored in the media. 
Compared to the other equations estimated in this paper, the determinants of Model 2 
explain a fairly large portion of the variation in the dependent variable. According to the 
adjusted R2, more than 70% of the variation in the length of coverage can be assigned to 
the variation in the explanatory variables mentioned in the previous paragraphs.  
 
4.3 Results: Determinants of the Dispersion of Favorableness 
The average favorableness gives a good idea about how positively or negatively a board 
decision is accepted. However, sometimes the stances of several journalists differ 
substantially from each other. This can happen either purely randomly or because the 
economic situation is unclear, the decision is controversial or poorly explained, or simply 
                                                           
8 In the period considered, the average absolute inter-meeting change amounts to 1.02%, with a 





different journalists base their coverage on interviews with different analysts and some of 
them predict the decision of the bank better or with more luck than the others, etc. 
When we use the same set of explanatory variables as in the regression explaining the 
level of favorableness, two variables appear to be statistically significant in explaining the 
heterogeneity of favorableness. Surprise is the main driver of the dispersion – the more 
surprising is the decision, the more dispersed is the favorableness of coverage. Another 
statistically significant determinant of dispersion is the level of interest rates. The 
estimation results are summarized in Table 7. 
Table7: Determinants of Dispersion of Favorableness (Model 3) 
Surprise - Market IR Reaction (abs) 0.987 ***
(0.339)
Monetary Policy Interest Rate Change (abs) 0.317
(0.256)






Recent CPI Inflation Change -0.006
(0.057)





Number of observations 56  
Note: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. The number of observations is lower due to meetings with 
too few monetary policy related articles to calculate the dispersion.  
 
While the relationship between dispersion and the exogenous determinants is limited, the 
analysis in part 3.4 shows strong connections between the dispersion of favorableness on 
the one hand and the absolute level of favorableness and the length of coverage on the 
other hand. As Table 2 illustrates, coverage with more dispersed favorableness is longer.  
 
4.4 Results: Explaining the Number of Title Page Articles 
Due to the count nature of the data, several count data models were considered in the 
estimation of the number of title page articles in the four newspapers considered. As the 
coverage of many meetings results in no title page articles at all and the mean and 
variance of our variable of interest, extent4, are not substantially different, we chose the 
Poisson model as our preferred one. A post-estimation goodness-of-fit test validates our 
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Table 8: Determinants of the Number of Title Pages (Model 4) 
 
Surprise - Market IR Reaction (abs) 1.714 7.599 **
(3.483) (3.497)
Monetary Policy Interest Rate Change (abs) 3.366 3.516
(2.703) (2.584)
Communication Intensity - Governor 0.393 ** 0.355 **
(0.185) (0.175)
Communication Intensity - Other Board Members 0.229 ** 0.318 ***
(0.116) (0.109)
Forecast Released 0.077 0.237
(0.664) (0.434)
Recent CPI Inflation Change 0.39 0.414
(0.758) (0.558)




Constant (cut 1) 2.491 ***
(0.475)
Constant (cut 2) 3.364 ***
(0.636)
Constant (cut 3) 4.297 ***
(0.796)
Constant (cut 4) 4.895 ***
(0.937)
Pseudo R-squared 0.34 0.39
Number of observations 69 69
Poisson Ordered  probit 
 
Note: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Coefficients are estimated using Poisson regression (first 
column) and ordered probit regression (second column). Constants cut 1 – cut 4 are cut 
points estimated as a part of ordered probit estimation. As communication intensity defined 
for all board members is statistically significant determinant of the number of title pages, 
the effect is investigated further by distinguishing the communication of governor from 
communication of other board members. 
 
Communication intensity in the inter-meeting period is not statistically significant in 
explaining the favorableness and length of coverage. However, it plays a major part when 
it comes to the number of title page articles published after the meeting. As the 
communication intensity defined for all members of the board is a statistically significant 
determinant (table not reported here), we go one step further and estimate the effect of 
communication intensity separately for the governor and the other board members (Table 
8)
9. On average, an additional inter-meeting statement of the governor or other member of 
the board increases the number of title page articles covering the meeting by 0.39 and 
0.23
10, respectively. A rising intensity of inter-meeting statements of individual board 
members tends to increase the probability that the article covering the subsequent 
                                                           
9 The same differentiation is used in Berger, Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2006), where the communication 
of the president of the ECB is found to be more important than the communication of  the other 
committee members in explaining both favorableness and extent.  





monetary policy decision will be displayed on the title page of the dailies reporting on the 
bank board decision. 
For the sake of robustness, we estimate Model 4 also using ordinal probit regression. The 
results (reported in the second column of Table 8) confirm the relationship between 
communication and the number of title page articles. However, the results from the 
ordinal probit regression emphasize the role of surprise in the decision – the more 
surprising the decision is for the market, the more attention it gets on the title pages of 
newspapers. When the difference between analysts’ expectations about the interest rate 
change and the actual decision is used as a proxy for surprise instead of the market 
reaction, the significance of the coefficient on surprise remains the same but the 
coefficient on the absolute change in the interest rate becomes significant in both cases – 
Poisson as well as ordered probit regression (not reported here). 
 
4.5 Additional Estimations 
In addition to the estimations reported in the previous part, a number of alternative 
specifications were considered to assess the importance of particular determinants. We 
discuss the results estimated using these alternative specifications in the following 
paragraphs.  
 
Serial Correlation in Favorableness 
The favorableness of media coverage can theoretically be influenced by some kind of 
sentiment toward the central bank which can change only gradually over time. We tested 
this hypothesis by including lagged favorableness among the determinants of Model 1. 
The estimated coefficient on the lagged variable does not suggest any statistically 
significant serial correlation.  
Other Communication Tools 
Using the framework presented in previous parts, we tested the effects of the 
communication tools that were introduced during the period considered. These included 
a) slides at the press conference after monetary policy meetings, b) the “interest rate 
sentence”
11, and c) the release of the ratio of the votes cast by individual board members 
for alternative decisions. In addition to testing the hypothesis that the introduction of the 
interest rate sentence influenced the favorableness or the length of coverage, we 
investigated whether concord of the interest rate sentence and the subsequent actual 
decision
12 matters for favorableness.  
                                                           
11 The so-called “interest rate sentence” is a verbal description of the future interest rate path consistent 
with the forecast, released together with the new forecast, i.e. once every three months, and presented 
at the press conference, in the minutes of the board meeting and in the Inflation Report.  
12 The concord of the “interest rate sentence” and the subsequent actual decision is defined in Table 41. 26   Jiří Böhm, Petr Král and Branislav Saxa 
 
   
Although we believe that these tools help to explain the monetary policy decisions of the 
central bank, none of aforementioned instruments was found to be statistically significant. 
This could be a result, however, of the relatively small number of observations and the 
low variance in the data on the determinants considered (the incorporation of each tool is 
represented by a dummy variable equal to one from its introduction onwards and equal to 
zero before the month of introduction). The effect of concord is not significant either. 
Other Determinants 
Besides testing the effect of the additional communication tools described in the previous 
paragraph, we also tested the potential effects of other factors: uncertainty about the next 
policy decision, the ratio of votes and the interest rate setting of the ECB. 
Two proxy variables for the uncertainty of the next policy decision are used. The first 
one, Uncertainty, comes from a survey called Financial Market Inflation Expectations 
conducted by the CNB
13. The variable is equal to the standard deviation of analysts’ 
expectations of the 2-week repo rate at the horizon of one month. This is our preferred 
proxy for uncertainty. The second variable, Reuters uncertainty, is based on Reuters polls 
and employs the numbers of analysts expecting no change along with the total number of 
analysts
14. Our primary hypothesis related to uncertainty is that increased uncertainty 
before a monetary policy decision increases the length of coverage after the decision is 
made. Our estimation, however, does not support this hypothesis. At the same time, 
neither IOFT uncertainty nor Reuters uncertainty is a significant determinant of variation 
in favorableness and dispersion of favorableness. However, communication influences the 
extent and the dispersion of favorableness differently under low and high uncertainty, as 
we show in the next section. 
Homogeneity of the board members’ views might also play a part in how newspapers 
cover monetary policy meetings. To proxy homogeneity of views, we employ the ratio of 
the number of board members voting for the actual decision to the total number of board 
members present at the meeting. The estimation, shown in Table A9 in the appendix, 
suggests that homogeneity of the board members’ views influences the extent of coverage 
– the more dispersed the votes are (reflected in a lower voting ratio), the longer the 
following coverage becomes. Besides length of coverage, the number of title pages is 
influenced significantly – the more dispersed are the views of the members of the board, 
the higher (substantially) is the number of newspapers publishing an article on the title 
page (Table A10 in the appendix). 
 
                                                           
13 The respondents in the Financial Market Inflation Expectations survey consist primarily of analysts 
from commercial banks operating in the Czech Republic. 
14 Reuters uncertainty equals 1-2*ABS(0.5-number of analysts expecting no change/total number of 
analysts), where ABS is an operator of absolute value, i.e. it approaches zero if the fraction of analysts 
expecting no change is high (no interest rate change widely expected) or if the fraction of analysts 
expecting no change is small (either a hike or a cut widely expected). Otherwise it is higher than zero, 





The other tested hypotheses concern the interest rate setting of the ECB. The Czech 
economy is closely linked to the eurozone economy through various channels, and the 
interest rate setting in the eurozone to a certain extent naturally influences the interest rate 
setting of the CNB. We tested the hypotheses that the distance between CNB and ECB 
interest rates explains favorableness and extent of coverage as well as the hypotheses that 
a CNB interest rate change occurring right after an ECB interest rate change influences 
favorableness and extent. We test these hypotheses by augmenting the baseline 
specifications of Models 1 and 2 with the distance between the two interest rates and the 
interaction of interest rate changes, respectively. None of these hypotheses are supported 
by our estimations (results not reported here). 
 
Table 9: Definitions of Selected Variables Used in Additional Estimations 
Variable Definition
Slides at the press conference
Dummy equal to one since January 2004 onwards. Equal
to zero until December 2003.
Introduction of "interest rate sentence"
Dummy equal to one since July 2002 onwards. Equal to
zero until June 2002.
Releasing the number of board 
members voting for different decisions
Dummy equal to one since February 2006 onwards. Equal
to zero until January 2006.
Concord of "interest rate sentence" and 
actual decisions
Dummy indicating whether the interest rate change
suggested by the "interest rate sentence" is in line with
actual decision on the interest rate. Equals one, if interest
rate moves in the suggested direction either in current
meeting or in any previous meeting since recent release
of forecast (new "interest rate sentence" is formulated
within each quarterly forecast). Equals zero otherwise. Not
defined until June 2002. 
IOFT uncertainty
Survey based proxy for market uncertainty. Equals
standard deviation of analysts' expectations of 2-week
repo rate in the horizon of one month. Survey used to be
conducted aproximately one to two weeks before the
monetary policy meeting of the board. 
Reuters uncertainty
Alternative survey based proxy for market uncertainty
about upcoming interest rate decision. Equals 1-
2*ABS(0.5-number of analysts expecting no
change/number of all analysts).
Voting ratio
Number of board members voting for the actual decision
over the number of all board members present at the
meeting.
Distance from the ECB interest rate
Equals the absolute value of the difference between the
CNB and the ECB key interest rates.
Coordination of the interest rate change 
with the ECB
Dummy equal to one, if both the CNB and the ECB
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4.6 Interactions 
Finally, we consider the possibility that the effects of certain determinants depend on 
other factors. This is implemented using the interactions between the determinants 
already introduced. Interactions which are significant in explaining favorableness, its 
dispersion, or the extent of coverage are discussed below. Some other tested interactions 
are discussed afterwards. 
One of the important questions is whether appropriate communication can mitigate the 
negative effects of a surprising decision on the favorableness of coverage. As we do not 
have any qualitative measure of communication, we test whether the amount of 
communication is related to the magnitude of the negative effect of a surprise on 
favorableness. More specifically, we augment Model 1 with the interaction of 
communication intensity and the dummy for high surprise
15 and with the necessary high 
surprise dummy itself. The results are summarized in Table A11 in the appendix. Based 
on the estimated coefficients, the effect of a surprising decision is more negative and 
statistically significant if the surprising decision is preceded by intensive communication. 
The same result can be found if only the communication of the governor is considered 
instead of the communication of all board members (Table A12 in the appendix). One 
could interpret the result as a recommendation for board members pursuing positive 
favorableness of coverage: you should not communicate your preliminary views on the 
upcoming monetary policy decision too strongly especially (i) under high uncertainty, 
when the situation is unclear and it is difficult for you to guess your peers’ attitude, or (ii) 
when you feel you will dissent from the future final board decision. The thread is then the 
following: if market participants do not understand your and other board members’ 
statements properly and they are surprised by the board’s subsequent interest rate 
decision, then the perception will be much more negative compared to the situation where 
a (sometimes needed) surprising decision is not preceded by intensive communication.  
Another interesting result is based on the interference of high uncertainty and intensity of 
communication. Although the intensity of pre-meeting communication itself does not 
have significant effect on the length of the coverage in general, more intensive 
communication expands the length of the coverage at times of increased uncertainty. 
Table A13 in the appendix summarizes the results of the estimation. Again, practically the 
same mechanism can be found if we consider only the communication of the governor 
instead of the communication of all members of the board (see Table A14 in the 
appendix). In addition to favorableness itself, the dispersion of favorableness increases 
with the intensity of communication if the uncertainty is high. See Table A15 in the 
appendix for details. 
Besides interactions that are statistically significant in explaining favorableness, its 
dispersion and the extent of coverage, a number of other interactions were considered, 
tested and found to be insignificant. Among the most prominent ones, we tested the 
hypothesis that the release of the forecast increases the length of coverage more at times 
                                                           
15 Defined as follows: the high surprise dummy is equal to one if the absolute market interest rate 





of high uncertainty and the hypothesis that the reaction to a surprising decision is 
different at times of high uncertainty. 
 
4.7 Reality and the Model: Looking at the Model Residuals 
The model predictions naturally do not always match reality in either the length or 
favorableness of articles. Generally speaking, there are number of factors that could lie 
behind this, although most of them are hard or even impossible to verify exactly. The 
length of articles could have been affected, for example, by the emergence of other, more 
interesting topics at a particular time, whereas the favorableness may have been 
influenced, say, by errors or inconsistency of the assessors. Simultaneously, a changing 
structure of journalists and attitude of individual dailies over time could have determined 
both. As far as the length of articles is concerned, some journalists tend to be rather 
expansive, whereas others express their opinions in fewer words. On the other hand, we 
do not know whether or not the extent of articles was limited by editors and, if so, to what 
degree. Regarding the favorableness of articles, the attitude of individual journalists to the 
CNB differs and may vary over time and across newspapers. 
To investigate the possible causes of the deviations of the model predictions from the 
actual values, we identify the meetings with the highest model residuals. Figures A7, A8 
and A9 in the appendix depict the residual versus fitted plots for the baseline models 
explaining the level, length and dispersion of favorableness, respectively. “Abnormal” 
articles in terms of both length and favorableness were identified twice – on February 1, 
2002 and on November 1, 2002. In the former case, both the total length and the 
favorableness were higher than predicted, whereas in the latter case they were lower than 
predicted.  
The articles published after the meetings with the biggest residuals can be found in Table 
A16 in the appendix. The columns of this table give the date of issue of the article, the 
change in monetary policy interest rates, information on whether this monetary policy 
decision was expected or not, the key issues discussed in these articles and finally the 
possible reasons for the deviations. A look at the articles themselves, however, does not 
provide a sufficient explanation. Therefore, we tried to look at the specific topics that 
were published on the front pages of the dailies examined, as well as in columns devoted 
to economic and financial topics. Although this approach cannot help to explain 
differences in favorableness, it can be useful in examining differences in the length of 
articles. Historical contextualizing of these “privileged” articles may confirm or rule out 
the hypotheses that (1) monetary policy texts were from time to time crowded out by 
more attractive topics and (2) monetary policy articles were inflated during silly seasons 
when there was a lack of attractive issues to be covered.  
This approach yielded the expected fruits. The shorter length of the articles, for example, 
on February 2, 2002 can indeed be easily explained by the crowding-out effect. Dramatic 
events on the domestic policy scene, chiefly a disintegration of the coalition of the four 
governing parties, dominated the front pages and economic and financial columns. 30   Jiří Böhm, Petr Král and Branislav Saxa 
 
   
Nevertheless, despite the shorter-than-predicted length of articles, monetary policy issues 
were fairly discussed at that time. They appeared on the front pages of all but one of the 
dailies examined and their length in the relevant columns seemed to be close to the 
average. One possible explanation is that the strictly limited space in the dailies did not 
allow these articles to be adequately, i.e. proportionally, long. The crowding-out effect 
also explains the shorter extent of articles focused on monetary policy issues on April 30, 
2004, when the entry of the Czech Republic into the EU the next day (May 1, 2004) 
dominated the articles (both general and economic ones) that were published in the dailies 
at that time.  
On the other hand, the silly season effect to large extent explains why the actual length of 
articles on monetary policy markedly exceeded that predicted by the model in some cases, 
for example on July 28, 2006. A lack of attractive topics at that time forced journalists to 
write about obviously insignificant topics, specifically about the extreme heat and its 
adverse effects on everyday life. Monetary policy issues were thus used to fill the empty 
space as well. This is why a rather long educative excursus appeared in one of the articles 
examined, and why numerous comparisons of the interest rate level at home and in the 
EU countries were included in the remaining articles. As a matter of fact, the actual 
monetary policy decision, its context and the economic circumstances at that time were 
rather “boring.” 
 
5. Robustness Checks 
To assess the robustness of the presented results, we performed a series of robustness 
checks. In this section, we describe the robustness checks performed and discuss their 
implications. 
As the first step toward assessing the robustness of the reported results, we employ the 
alternative measures of favorableness and extent defined in detail in section 3. The 
estimations of the baseline models using the alternative measures reported in Tables A17–
A20 in the appendix show that the results remain qualitatively the same.  
Secondly, a series of alternative specifications was estimated to see whether adding or 
dropping a particular variable influences the regression coefficients considerably. No such 
case was identified, except in the case of the relatively highly correlated surprise and 
release of the new forecast discussed at the end of section 5.1. Indeed, the 
multicollinearity test provides a low VIF
16 for all the explanatory variables in all three 
baseline models. 
In another step in the series of robustness checks, we investigate the influence of outliers. 
An obvious candidate is the very first meeting, for which the favorableness was extremely 
negative (-1.2, compared to the mean of 0.09 and the standard deviation of 0.29 – see 
                                                           
16 The variance inflation factor (VIF) is a measure of multicollinearity. The VIF quantifies how much 





Figure A1). The removal of this extreme observation leads to changes in magnitude for 
some coefficients, although the direction remains unchanged (see Table A6 in the 
appendix). In addition, the coefficient on the release of the new forecast becomes non-
significant with the reduced sample. 
Finally, we use quantile regressions to evaluate marginal effects in different quantiles of 
the dependent variable. Figures A10–A12 in the appendix summarize the results 
graphically. They enable us to answer the following question: Is the effect of the 
particular explanatory variable the same for the whole range of favorableness (extent and 
dispersion of favorableness) or does it change? The first plot of Figure A10 shows that a 
surprising decision has a less negative effect on favorableness in cases of very negative 
coverage than in cases of neutral or more negative coverage. Overall, Figures A10–A12 
do not provide any worrying result.  
 
6. Summary and Conclusions 
In our paper we identify factors explaining the variability of the favorableness and the 
extent of coverage of the CNB’s monetary policy decisions in the media in the period of 
2002–2007. We make use of an extensive set of articles published on the days 
immediately following monetary policy meetings in the four most relevant Czech daily 
broadsheets. The robust results of our estimates show that some parameters of the CNB’s 
actual decisions and their communication as well as several variables characterizing the 
contemporary economic environment are significant in explaining the variability of the 
media’s coverage. Simultaneously, our analyses shed some light on how the media tends 
to report on (economic) events in general. 
Starting with the latter, we find that very positive and very negative articles tend to be 
longer than neutral ones. Simultaneously, more dispersed favorableness across articles is 
associated with more extensive coverage.  
When summing up our major fundamental results concerning favorableness of coverage, 
we can conclude the following. The fact that the CNB from time to time surprises the 
market when setting interest rates is perceived neutrally in the media, which might be 
interpreted as indicating that the media has got used to the fact that surprise belongs to the 
standard monetary policy making of (not only) the CNB. In other words, the media does 
not get excited by the fact that the CNB usually leads the market through the monetary 
cycle.  
The media welcomes it when the CNB makes changes to interest rates regardless of the 
direction of change. Thus, the media probably understands that such changes are intended 
and needed to rein in inflation or steer it toward the target and to smooth economic 
shocks. This can be considered a good environment for the CNB to fulfill its mandate. 
And simultaneously, it is probably a result of the transparent inflation targeting regime 
the CNB has been applying for years. 32   Jiří Böhm, Petr Král and Branislav Saxa 
 
   
Finally, intensity of CNB’s inter-meeting communication proxied by the number of bank 
board members statements proved to have a statistically significant negative effect on the 
favorableness of perception of the actual outcome of the subsequent meeting if intensive 
communication precedes a surprising decision.     
All the above-mentioned conclusions are related to the factors that are under the direct 
influence of the CNB, since they form part of its actual monetary policy decision and of 
the communication of that decision. As a complement, the following facts have been 
discovered regarding factors capturing the contemporary economic conditions at times of 
individual monetary policy meetings. 
The media does not like rising inflation (and conversely it likes disinflation), which is 
probably perceived as a failure by the CNB to fulfill its commitment. Similarly to 
inflation, the media likes accelerating GDP growth (and does not like slowing growth), 
which is quite understandable and intuitive.  
These results simultaneously shed some light on the way journalists and the public might 
process macroeconomic news. As journalist and commentators get used to a certain level 
of a macroeconomic indicator quite swiftly, a change in the indicator compared to its 
previous month’s or quarter’s value is likely to have a stronger impact on the perception 
of the indicator than the level of the indicator itself or a deviation from its target or trend. 
A level (despite being very high or very low) is often not as attractive for journalists as a 
change. Only a change can be perceived as an event, and obviously the media generally 
tends to report on events rather than on states.  
Appreciation of the koruna exchange rate seems to be negatively perceived in the media 
regardless of the actual level of the exchange rate vis-à-vis its trend. Inversely, 
depreciation of the exchange rate increases the favorableness of articles covering the 
CNB’s meetings.  
As for the extent of media coverage we found the following, starting again with factors 
under the direct control of the CNB. Despite being perceived neutrally, an unexpected 
CNB interest rate decision generally attracts the attention of the media. Similarly, interest 
rate changes – irrespective of their direction – are in principle extensively covered in the 
media, unlike decisions to leave interest rates unchanged. Intensity of inter-meeting 
communication proved to have a statistically significant effect on the extent of coverage 
of the interest rate decision only in the following special cases. First, higher 
communication intensity by bank board members leads to an increased probability that 
the article covering the subsequent monetary policy decision will be displayed on the title 
page of the dailies reporting on it. And second, more intensive communication expands 
the length of coverage at times of heightened uncertainty.  
It is favorable that the release of a new quarterly macroeconomic forecast attracts the 
attention of the media. It thus turns out that one of the CNB’s most important policy and 
communication devices seems to be – at least partly – fulfilling its role. As for 





extent of coverage. A decline in GDP growth is, however, associated with more extensive 
coverage. 
Based on our results, it is clear that volatility of the exchange rate is a good reason to 
write about the CNB’s monetary policy meetings. This might be because the exchange 
rate influences a lot of economic variables in the Czech economy, hence it is naturally a 
subject of public debate and that debate is mirrored in the media. 
Comparing our results with those presented in the pioneering work of Berger, Ehrmann 
and Fratzscher (2006) focused on the coverage of the ECB’s actions, one can find a 
couple of differences. Most notably, unlike in the case of the ECB, surprising decisions of 
the CNB do not lead to significantly less favorable coverage. While a surprising decision 
of the ECB leads to less coverage, a surprising decision of the CNB increases the extent 
of coverage in terms of both length and the number of title page articles. On the other 
hand, the results of the two studies are similar in several aspects: an interest rate change is 
perceived more favorably than keeping interest rates unchanged and leads to longer 
coverage, while higher inflation (or inflation above the target) leads to more negative 
coverage.  
All in all, the factors that turned out to be significant for favorableness, its dispersion and 
the extent of coverage of the CNB’s decisions suggest that media tends to understand in 
general, although not in all aspects, what the CNB usually does in the field of monetary 
policy and why it does it, and pays proper attention to its decisions where appropriate. In 
our view, the most appealing results are that those CNB’s decisions that surprise financial 
markets are − if needed − not negatively perceived by the media and that the media on the 
contrary welcomes interest rate changes regardless of their direction. Therefore, from the 
media coverage point of view, there is no need for too much smoothing.  
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DNES Lidove noviny Pravo
Number of meetings covered 66 32 35 35
Average favorableness 0.11 -0.02 0.02 0.12
Std. deviation 0.40 0.43 0.54 0.40
Average absolute favorableness 0.32 0.23 0.44 0.30
Std. deviation 0.32 0.39 0.39 0.31
Average length (in words) of coverage 
per meeting (if covered) 551 396 445 406
Std. deviation 404 287 373 337
Average number of articles per 
meeting (if covered) 1 . 81 . 31 . 71 . 2
Std. deviation 0.9 0.6 1.0 0.4
Number of articles on the title page/ 
Number of all articles
1
0.21 0.16 0.40 0.31  
Notes: 
1 inverse of title page coefficient (see the text) 
 







evaluator #1 263 0.13 0.68
evaluator #2 263 0.10 0.75
evaluator #3 263 -0.03 0.64
average 263 0.06 0.57  
 
Table A3: Comparison of Evaluations 
 
- 2 - 1012 - 2 - 1012
-2 3 1 1       -2 4 1      
-1 1 10 9 2       -1 4981      
0 1 29 105 43 1 0 1 15 160 3      
1 42 12 3       1 33 12 3
2 252 2 63
- 2 - 1012
-2 54
-1 1 2931
0 27 117 57
1 1 1 272
2                   6      




























Note: Number denote the number of articles evaluated by two independent evaluators as respective column 
and row denote. 




Table A4. The Differences between Newspapers: Pairwise Correlations of Favorableness 
pp
Hospodarske noviny Mlada fronta DNES Lidove noviny
Mlada fronta DNES 0.61
Lidove noviny 0.43 0.28
Pravo 0.21 0.00 0.22  
 
Table A5: Determinants of Favorableness (Alternative Set of Determinants) 
Surprise - Market IR Reaction (abs)                   -0.299    
(0.448)    
Monetary Policy Interest Rate Change (abs)            0.351    
(0.266)    
Recent CPI Inflation -0.042    
(0.030)    
Recent GDP Growth Change 0.31 ** 
(0.130)    
Communication Intensity -0.033    
(0.021)    
Forecast Released                                    -0.143 *  
(0.085)    
EURCZK Inter-meeting change (4.571) *  
(2.693)    
Constant 0.305 ***
(0.093)    
Adjusted R-squared 0.254
Number of observations 69  
Note: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
Table A6: Determinants of Favorableness (without the first, most extreme observation) 
Surprise - Market IR Reaction (abs)                   -0.545
(0.338)
Monetary Policy Interest Rate Change (abs)            0.568 ***
(0.188)
Interest Rate Level -0.146 **
(0.064)
Recent CPI Inflation Change  -0.125 **
(0.055)




Forecast Released                                    -0.102
(0.065)
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Note: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 









Table A8: Surprising Decisions Occurred More Often Simultaneously with the Presentation of 
the New Forecast  
0 0.25 0.5 0.75 0 0.25 0.5 0.75
Forecast Released 1 3 2---6 1 1
No Forecast Released 3 8 5---3--
Not-surprising decision Surprising decision
Monetary Policy Interest 
Rate Change (abs)   
Monetary Policy Interest 
Rate Change (abs)   
 
 
Table A9: Determinants of Length (voting ratio is a proxy for the homogeneity of board 
members´ views) 
 
Surprise - Market IR Reaction (abs) 4394.1 ***
(1584.3)
Monetary Policy Interest Rate Change (abs) 2059.3 *
(1033.3)
Recent CPI Inflation Change 106.1
(115.9)




Forecast Released 532.8 ***
(198.2)
EURCZK Inter-meeting change (abs) 20724.7 **
(9656.3)





Number of observations 69  
Note: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 




Table A10: Determinants of the Number of Title Pages (voting ratio is a proxy for the 
homogeneity of board members´ views) 
 
Surprise - Market IR Reaction (abs) 0.376 4.731
(3.233) (3.699)
Monetary Policy Interest Rate Change (abs) 3.062 3.714
(2.555) (2.679)
Communication Intensity - Governor 0.29 ** 0.357 **
(0.136) (0.163)
Communication Intensity - Other Board Members 0.14 0.32 **
(0.142) (0.139)
Forecast Released -0.074 0.113
(0.615) (0.446)
Recent CPI Inflation Change 0.073 0.255
(0.667) (0.544)
Recent GDP Growth Change 0.477 * -0.097
(0.285) (0.394)




Constant (cut 1) 2.491
(0.475)
Constant (cut 2) 3.364
(0.636)
Constant (cut 3) 4.297
(0.796)
Constant (cut 4) 4.895 **
(0.937)
Pseudo R-squared 0.41 0.43
Number of observations 69 69
Poisson Ordered  probit 
 
 
Note: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Coefficients are estimated using Poisson regression (first column) 
and ordered probit regression (second column). Constants cut 1 – cut 4 are cut points estimated as a 
part of ordered probit estimation. As communication intensity defined for all board members is 
statistically significant determinant of the number of title pages, the effect is investigated further by 
distinguishing the communication of governor from communication of other board members. 
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Table A11: Determinants of Favorableness – Interaction of Surprise and Communication 
High Surprise 0.254 ** 
(0.101)    
Communication Intensity x High Surprise   -0.096 ***
(0.035)    
Monetary Policy Interest Rate Change (abs)            0.531 ***
(0.144)    
Interest Rate Level -0.18 ** 
(0.073)    
Recent CPI Inflation Change  -0.128 ** 
(0.056)    
Recent GDP Growth Change 0.284 ***
(0.089)    
Communication Intensity 0.006    
(0.021)    
Forecast Released                                    -0.144 ** 
(0.065)    
Constant 0.533 ***
(0.192)    
Adjusted R-squared 0.44
Number of observations 69  
Note: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
Table A12: Determinants of Favorableness – Interaction of Surprise and Communication 
(governor only) 
High Surprise 0.173 ***
(0.062)    
Communication Intensity (Governor) x High Surprise   -0.242 ***
(0.056)    
Monetary Policy Interest Rate Change (abs)            0.413 ** 
(0.174)    
Interest Rate Level -0.162 ** 
(0.077)    
Recent CPI Inflation Change  -0.118 ** 
(0.055)    
Recent GDP Growth Change 0.313 ***
(0.082)    
Communication Intensity - Governor 0.044    
(0.035)    
Forecast Released                                    -0.149 ***
(0.054)    
Constant 0.478 ***
(0.174)    
Adjusted R-squared 0.481
Number of observations 69  
Note: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 




Table A13: Determinants of Length – Interaction of Communication and Uncertainty 
Surprise - Market IR Reaction (abs) 5807.3 ***
(1623.470)
Monetary Policy Interest Rate Change (abs) 2227.8 **
(1101.765)
Recent CPI Inflation Change 168.74
(136.239)






Communication Intensity x Uncertainty 1300.5 *
(730.268)
Forecast Released 633.64 ***
(220.687)





Number of observations 69  
Note: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
Table A14: Determinants of Length – Interaction of Communication and Uncertainty 
(governor only) 
Surprise - Market IR Reaction (abs) 6396.6 ***
(1650.046)
Monetary Policy Interest Rate Change (abs) 1862
(1149.960)
Recent CPI Inflation Change 183.18
(146.923)
Recent GDP Growth Change -758.2 **
(327.415)




Communication Intensity - Governor x Uncertainty 2757.9 *
(1412.653)
Forecast Released 652.35 ***
(200.934)





Number of observations 69  
Note: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 42   Jiří Böhm, Petr Král and Branislav Saxa 
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Table A15: Determinants of Dispersion of Favorableness – Interaction of Communication and 
Uncertainty 
Surprise - Market IR Reaction (abs) 1.128 ***
(0.340)    
Monetary Policy Interest Rate Change (abs) 0.323    
(0.274)    
Interest Rate Level 0.063    
(0.041)    
Communication Intensity -0.018    
(0.021)    
Forecast Released -0.016    
(0.056)    
Recent CPI Inflation Change 0    
(0.053)    
Recent GDP Growth Change 0.025    
(0.105)    
Uncertainty -1.175 *  
(0.674)    
Communication Intensity x Uncertainty 0.374 *  
(0.214)    
Constant 0.139    
(0.123)    
Adjusted R-squared 0.335
Number of observations 56  
 
Note: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. The number of observations is lower due to meetings with too few 
monetary policy related articles to calculate the dispersion. 
 











Key issues discussed Possible reasons 
1.2.2002 -0,25 no
forex interventions rather than cut in 
interest rates expected, zig-zag 
policy, too much pesimism, more 
robust reaction expected 
reasons for at least "normal" 
length of article   model error
30.4.2004 stability yes option to earlier rise in interest rates
no major differences to periods of 
other monetary policy decissions 
  model error
26.1.2007 stability yes
correction of previous forecast, too 
much optimism
no major differences to periods of 
other monetary policy decissions 
  model error
1.11.2002 -0,25 yes
support of economic growth, against 
koruna appreciation, in keeping with 
expectations 
no hot topics for long articles   
model error
1.4.2005 -0,25 yes
credits will not be much cheaper, 
firms will resist strong koruna 
exchange rate, changes in the CNB 
Bank board
impact of dicussions, which will be 
the reaction of banks and 
comparisons to developments in 
Europe 
28.7.2006 0.25 yes
the end of cheap loans era, rather 
long educative article 
impact of a rather long educational 
article
1.2.2002 -0,25 no
forex interventions rather than cut in 
interest rates expected, zig-zag 
policy, too much pesimism, more 
robust reaction expected 
reasons exist but does not seem 
strong enough   model and/or 
assessors failures
29.3.2002 stability no
the CNB resigned from fight against 
koruna appreciation, privatisation 
account does not work (all bears 
witness to predomination of 
exchange rate topics) 
reasons exist but does not seem 
strong enough   model and/or 
assessors failures
29.7.2005 stability yes
stable interest rates + higher inflation 
forecast = negative real interest 
rates 
reasons exist but does not seem 
strong enough   model and/or 
assessors failures
27.1.2006 stability yes
strong koruna exchange rate, 
criticism of shift in the CNB monetary 
policy 
reasons exist but does not seem 
strong enough   model and/or 
assessors failures
1.11.2002 -0,25 yes
support of economic growth, against 
koruna appreciation, in keeping with 
expectations 
reasons exist but does not seem 
strong enough   model and/or 
assessors failures
18.12.2003 stability yes
the end of cut in interest rates due to 
recovery abroad and starting 
acceleration in inflation
reasons exist but does not seem 
strong enough   model and/or 
assessors failures
1.6.2007 0.25 yes
a demand-driven rapid economic 
growth, rising inflation, slower 
koruna appreciation dampens price 
growrth less than before 
reasons exist but does not seem 
strong enough   model and/or 
assessors failures
Coverage shorter compared to model
Coverage longer compared to model
Favourableness worse compared to model
Favourableness better compared to model
 
 




Table A17: Determinants of Favorableness – Alternative Measure of Favorableness weighted 
by Circulation of Newspapers used (favorableness
2) 
 
Surprise - Market IR Reaction (abs) -0.078    
(0.455)    
Monetary Policy Interest Rate Change (abs) 0.284    
(0.301)    
Interest Rate Level -0.193 ***
(0.070)    
Recent CPI Inflation Change -0.157 ***
(0.059)    
Recent GDP Growth Change 0.335 ***
(0.109)    
Communication Intensity -0.022    
(0.018)    
Forecast Released -0.143 *  
(0.082)    
Constant 0.63 ***
(0.190)    
Adjusted R-squared 0.33
Number of observations 69  
Note: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
Table A18: Determinants of Favorableness – Alternative Measure of Favorableness weighted 
by Circulation of Newspapers and Title Page Coefficient  used (favorableness
3) 
 
Surprise - Market IR Reaction (abs) -0.361    
(0.437)    
Monetary Policy Interest Rate Change (abs) 0.448    
(0.310)    
Interest Rate Level -0.188 ***
(0.068)    
Recent CPI Inflation Change -0.155 ** 
(0.062)    
Recent GDP Growth Change 0.324 ***
(0.103)    
Communication Intensity -0.019    
(0.018)    
Forecast Released -0.144 *  
(0.077)    
Constant 0.614 ***
(0.181)    
Adjsuted R-squared 0.33    
Number of observations 69      













Surprise - Market IR Reaction (abs) 4658.3 ***
(1455.986)




Forecast Released 539.25 ***
(202.376)
Recent CPI Inflation Change 42.465
(119.394)
Recent GDP Growth Change -494.4
(351.241)





Number of observations 69  




Table A20: Determinants of Length – Alternative Measure of Extent weighted by Circulation of 
Newspapers and Title Page Coefficient used (extent
3) 
 
Surprise - Market IR Reaction (abs) 4724.869 ***
(1572.607)




Forecast Released 570.593 ***
(196.858)
Recent CPI Inflation Change 54.46
(120.445)
Recent GDP Growth Change -624.941 *
(345.526)





Number of observations 69  




















1 69 0.09 0.29 -1.22 0.67
Favorableness
2 69 0.08 0.29 -1.41 0.67
Favorableness
3 69 0.08 0.29 -1.26 0.67
Extent
1 69 1133.44 1108.93 58.00 5373.00
Extent
2 69 1034.92 1019.87 58.00 4724.10
Extent
3 69 1048.39 1018.65 58.00 4345.79
Extent
4 (Number of Title Pages) 69 0.59 1.10 0.00 4.00
Dispersion of Favorableness* 56 0.34 0.25 0.00 1.04
Surprise - Market Interest Rate Reaction (abs) 69 0.05 0.09 0.00 0.46
Monetary Policy Interest Rate Change 69 -0.02 0.16 -0.75 0.25
Monetary Policy Interest Rate Change (abs) 69 0.08 0.14 0.00 0.75
Interest Rate Level 69 2.45 0.60 1.75 4.25
Recent CPI Inflation 69 1.89 1.18 -0.40 4.10
Recent CPI Inflation Change 69 -0.03 0.45 -1.40 1.30
Recent GDP Growth Change 69 0.06 0.25 -0.46 1.15
Forecast Released 69 0.33 0.47 0.00 1.00
EURCZK Inter-meeting change 69 0.00 0.01 -0.03 0.03
EURCZK Inter-meeting change (abs) 69 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.03
EURCZK Inter-meeting change (appreciation) 69 -0.01 0.01 -0.03 0.00
EURCZK Inter-meeting change (depreciation) 69 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.03
Communication Intensity 69 3.23 2.13 0.00 9.00
Communication Intensity - Governor 69 0.83 1.07 0.00 5.00
Communication Intensity - Other Board Members 69 2.41 1.65 0.00 7.00
Uncertainty 69 0.06 0.07 0.00 0.35  
 
Note: * Dispersion is not defined for meetings with insufficient number of articles. 
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Figure A12: Determinants of Dispersion of Favorableness – Marginal Effects evaluated at 
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